Introduction
The 'comply-or-explain' system is premised on the inflexibility of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Under the 'comply-orexplain' system, 1 companies not complying with corporate governance code provisions are required to provide explanations.
The 'comply-or-explain' system introduces some flexibility for companies (Roberts, 2012, chap. 9) or what Veldman and Willmott (2016) term "reflexivity" À continuous, self-organizing improvement of regulatory practice. As Haxhi and Van Ees (2010) observe, an explanation is more than disclosure of non-compliance, highlighting that German soft law codes only require disclosure of non-compliance without motivation, compared with the Netherlands and the UK which require disclosure to be accompanied by an explanation. Explanations are key to the 'comply-or-explain' system and thus are worthy of careful examination. However, the system is only as good as the explanations provided by companies. Study of non-compliance explanations is important in judging the effectiveness of the 'comply-or-explain' system, given the continuing debate as to whether the voluntary nature of the system really works and criticism of the quality of explanations as being "perfunctory", "incomplete" or even "inexistent" (Sergakis, 2013, p. 397) . Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2017) comment that silence may be a particular tactic in relation to soft-law disclosures, where there is little or no oversight by regulators. For example, not providing an explanation of non-compliance under the 'comply-or-explain' provisions of corporate governance codes (i.e., the rhetoric of silence) may create the impression of compliance. A critical perspective is appropriate, as non-compliance explanations are part of what Gendron (2016, p. 10) calls "the constellation of hopes and expectations" around corporate governance and as such may involve the constitution and propagation of myths.
It is useful to consider what is meant by the term 'explanation'. "Explanations occur whenever attention moves beyond the mere offering of information to matters of meaning, relationships, causes, factors and reasons" (Aerts & Theunisse, 2001, pp. 91-92) . Explanations are likely to be deficient if they "fail to . . . hang together" (Keil, 2006, p. 239) . Table 1 summarises the historical development of the 'comply-or-explain' system in the UK to obtain insights into regulatory expectations underpinning the concept.
2 The Cadbury Report (1992, para 3.8) recommended 'reasons' for non-compliance be disclosed.
The Greenbury Report (1995, p. 13) required companies to "explain and justify" non-compliance. The Hempel Report (1998, para 1.11) required the explanation to reflect "any special circumstance". The Combined Code (1998, p. 1) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010, p. 4 ) specified that the explanation should be "careful and clear" and "illustrate how its [the company's] actual practices are consistent with the principle". Finally, the FRC (2012b) positioned explanations as rhetorical devices by introducing the notion of "convincing" explanations. The implicit assumption in the 'comply-orexplain' system is that "failure of governance can be remedied through yet more transparency" (Roberts, 2009, p. 962) . Roberts' questioning of transparency as a regulatory instrument of accountability contrasts with the FRC's (2012b, p. 6) selfcongratulatory view of the 'comply-or-explain' system as "widely admired and imitated internationally". The challenge, as observed by Tremblay and Gendron (2011, p. 260) , is that "prescriptions have limitations since they are necessarily interpreted and enacted by complex and oftentimes unpredictable human beings". Tremblay (2012) characterises corporate governance regulations as symbolic, only ceremonially adopted, yet strengthening people's view of social order such that they create "illusions of control" (p. 395). Highlighting the "portrayal gap" of corporate reporting, Boiral (2013, p. 1038) reflects on the misleading relationship between publicly available corporate information and, referring to misleading images and representation, simulacra used to camouflage problems and project an idealised view of the firm.
Shortcomings in the quality of explanations have been identified by both academics (Arcot, Bruno, & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Rose, 2016) and regulators (European Commission, 2011) , with the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2013, p. 2) stating that "the variable quality of explanations remains its [the UK Corporate Governance Code's] Achilles heel". The Bank of England Executive Director for Financial Stability, Haldane (2012, p. 7), observes that with complex regulations, managers may "manage to the rules" rather than applying the spirit or substance of those rules "focussing on the small print at the expense of the bigger picture". Keay (2014) questions whether, in providing explanations, boards of directors are motivated Table 1 Historical development of the 'comply-or-explain' system.
Source Description of system
Cadbury Report (1992, para 3.8) . . . to state whether they are complying with the Code and to give reasons for any areas of noncompliance (para 1.3) . . . but areas of non-compliance will have to be dealt with individually Greenbury Report (1995, p. 13) Include . . . a general statement about their compliance . . . which should also explain and justify any areas of non-compliance Hampel (1998) companies should be prepared to review and explain their governance policies, including any special circumstances which in their view justify departure from generally accepted best practice Combined Code (1998, p. 1) the company will be required either to confirm that it complies with the Code provisions orwhere it does not -provide an explanation. Again, it must be for shareholders and others to evaluate such explanations. Higgs Report (2003, para 1.14) Listed companies have to report on how they apply the Code's principles and to state whether they comply with the detailed provisions and, if not, why not. Combined Code (FRC, 2008, In providing an explanation, the company should aim to illustrate how its actual practices are both consistent with the principle to which the particular provision relates and contribute to good governance . . . It should set the context and historical background, should give a convincing rationale for the action it was taking, and describe mitigating action to address any additional risk and to maintain conformity with the relevant principle. Also the explanation should indicate whether the deviation from the Code's provision was limited in time and when the company intended to return to conformity with the Code's provision.
